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Chinese Special Operations in a Large-Scale Island Landing
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Summary
PLA special operations forces (SOF) would likely play important supporting roles in an amphibious
assault on Taiwan. Their capabilities and training are geared towards several missions undertaken
during the preparatory and main assault phases of the landing, including infiltration via special
mission craft and helicopter, reconnaissance and targeting, obstacle clearance, strikes and raids, and
extraction missions. While PLA SOF have made progress in recent years, several longstanding
challenges could affect their performance in an island landing: integrating advanced special mission
equipment for complex and dangerous missions, coordinating their operations with non-SOF
supporting and supported forces, and overcoming the Chinese military’s penchant for centralized
command. Even if PLA SOF are only partially effective, however, their support to the main assault
force could diminish Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from a large-scale invasion.
Introduction
One important but sometimes overlooked factor that will influence the success of a People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) attempt to seize Taiwan is special operations forces (SOF) support to the
main assault force.1 Special operations have contributed to amphibious assaults in several modern
campaigns, including Normandy (1944), the Falkland Islands (1982), and Grenada (1983). U.S. joint
doctrine for amphibious operations continues to assign SOF multiple roles, including military
information support, civil-military operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, special
reconnaissance, direct action, and preparation of the environment.2 During the preparatory and
primary landing phases of a Taiwan invasion, and even during a potential “mop up” campaign
against resistance fighters, the PLA would likely utilize SOF for similar purposes.3 Depending on
their performance, these forces could enable or frustrate the operations of conventional PLA units, or
perhaps have no effect at all.
This report addresses the potential role of PLA SOF in a Taiwan campaign from three perspectives.4
First is doctrine. By analyzing authoritative PLA publications, including the Lectures on the Science
of Special Operations, we find that PLA SOF are assigned three roles, including a primary role in
special reconnaissance and secondary roles in strikes/raids on key targets and in information
operations. Second is force structure and capabilities. The PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force
(PLAAF), PLA Army (PLAA), and People’s Armed Police (PAP) all possess SOF relevant to a
Taiwan contingency, including some forces that have expanded in recent years. The PLA has also
acquired special mission equipment relevant to amphibious missions, such as underwater personnel
delivery systems. Third is training. Based on PLA print and television media reports, PLA SOF have
focused on squad-level and individual skills training, but there is also evidence of SOF involvement
in larger combined-arms exercises. However, we found that joint training is limited, and there is
almost no open-source evidence of SOF actively preparing for information operations.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Congressionally mandated report on the Chinese military, for instance, contains
only scant references to SOF. The only allusion to SOF in an island landing is the statement that SOF could “infiltrate
Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets,” an assessment that is brief and does not fully
capture the range of SOF assignments. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), 113.
2
JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, January 21, 2021, VI-4.
3
For a general description of PLA concepts of island landing campaigns, see Michael Casey, “Firepower Strike, Blockade,
Landing: PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict,” in Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., Crossing the Strait (Washington, DC:
NDU Press, forthcoming).
4
While the focus of this report is island landings, PLA SOF would also play a role in a blockade.
1

The PLA has worked steadily over the last decade to ready SOF for an island landing scenario by
refining doctrine, bolstering capabilities, and improving training. However, there are several
variables that will influence these units’ performance, including their technical proficiency and
potential greater use of unmanned systems, which could replace humans in some roles but increase
technical proficiency requirements; degree of jointness, including the need for larger and more
frequent exercises with non-SOF units and continued reforms to joint command structures at and
below the theater level; and the degree to which commanders try to micromanage SOF activities on
the battlefield, which could lead to suboptimal results if those forces hesitate to act without explicit
approval. The Taiwan and U.S. defense establishments should work to evaluate these challenges and
weaknesses and determine whether plans for Taiwan’s defense adequately consider PLA SOF.

Exhibit 1. Members of the PLAA’s “Flying Dragons of the East” conduct an air assault exercise.5

Doctrine
PLA sources have increasingly noted the importance of special operations in modern warfare.6 Both
the 2013 Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) Science of Military Strategy and the 2020 National
Defense University (NDU) Science of Military Strategy place SOF alongside other specialized
capabilities, such as electronic warfare, aviation, missiles and missile defense, and information
warfare, that the military needs to prevail in future wars.7 Other volumes describe SOF as integral to

“In the waters of southern Fujian, Members of the Special Forces Ace Card ‘Flying Dragons of the East’ Parachuted
from the Sea for the First Time, Specializing in Beach Landings” [闽南海域，特战王牌“东海飞龙”首次海上跳伞 专攻
抢滩登陆], Sohu, August 2, 2021, https://www.sohu.com/a/481002417_120823584.
5

For an earlier analysis, see Dean Cheng, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Special Operations,” Special
Warfare, (July-September 2012),
www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2503/SW2503TheChinesePeoplesLiberationArmy.html.
6

The lengthiest discussions are in sections on army strategy, but air and naval SOF are also noted. 军事科学院军事战略
研究部 [Academy of Military Sciences Military Strategy Studies Department], 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy]
7
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military operations other than war, including overseas counter-terrorism missions.8 The 2020 NDU
Science of Military Strategy describes SOF as a form of “asymmetric warfare” that involves
reconnaissance, sabotage, strikes, and “psychological operations involving all types of technologies
and means.” The text encourages the PLA to build SOF capabilities in the areas of reconnaissance,
strike, and survival behind enemy lines.9
SOF roles in an island landing scenario are discussed in various campaign-level PLA texts. The 2006
NDU Science of Campaigns assesses that special operations will be conducted in island landings to
“isolate, split up, and collapse the enemy,” “weaken the enemy’s operational capabilities,” and
“decrease the intensity of the enemy’s resistance.”10 A 2013 AMS teaching volume, Lectures on
Joint Battles, notes that SOF would infiltrate behind enemy lines, destroy key targets, guide fire
assaults, and capture key enemy personnel.11 The most detailed descriptions are contained in another
2013 AMS teaching volume, Lectures on the Science of Special Operations. The authors begin their
analysis of special operations in an island landing through a sketch of the role that British SOF
played in the 1982 Falkland Islands campaign; those forces assisted the main landing force by
gathering intelligence and conducting raids to “confuse and disrupt” Argentine forces, allowing the
marines to land “with little resistance.”12
In Chinese operational concepts, SOF can play several distinct roles in an island landing. First and
likely most prominent is reconnaissance and targeting. 13 This includes monitoring weather or
hydrological conditions; scouting enemy positions and movements, as well as enemy obstructions in
the main landing approaches; tracking high-value enemy targets; identifying and illuminating targets
for conventional precision-guided missile strikes; and conducting battle damage assessment.14
Lectures on the Science of Special Operations observes that British SOF landed on East Falkland
island three weeks prior to the main assault, during which time they kept track of hydrological
conditions, monitored enemy troop movements, and evaluated enemy fortifications to “ensure the
smooth landing of the Marines and paratroopers.”15
Second are strikes and raids. Science of Campaigns describes SOF raids, including sabotaging
airfields, naval port facilities and ships, radar stations, command posts, ammunition depots, and/or
(Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2013), 205-6; 肖天亮 [Xiao Tianliang], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy]
(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2020), 265.
8
Kevin McCauley, “PLA Special Operations: Combat Missions and Operations Abroad,” China Brief, September 3, 2015,
https://jamestown.org/program/pla-special-operations-combat-missions-and-operations-abroad.
9
Xiao, Science of Military Strategy, 355.
10

张玉良 [Zhang Yuliang], ed., 战役学 [Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), 312.

11

陈荣弟 [Chen Rongdi], 联合战斗教程 [Lectures on Joint Battles] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 2013), 169.

郭明 [Guo Ming], 特种作战学教程 [Lectures on the Science of Special Operations] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press,
2013), 181. For a broader analysis of PLA lessons from this campaign, see Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the
Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons from the
Falklands/Malvinas Campaign,” in Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese Lessons from Other
People’s Wars (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 75-114.
12

The 2011 PLA’s dictionary of military terminology notes in its definition of “special operations” (特种作战) that an
alternative name for these activities is “special reconnaissance operations” (特种侦察作战). See 全军军事术语管理委员
会 [All-Military Terminology Management Committee], 中国人民解放军军语 [China People’s Liberation Army Military
Terminology] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011), 875.
14
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 199; Guo, Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, 183; Chen, Lectures on Joint
Battles, 76.
15
Guo, Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, 183.
13
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coastal observation posts, as an enabler of both air and sea dominance during the initial phases of an
island landing.16 During the landing phase, SOF would attempt to “pin down and scatter the enemy’s
operational forces,” reducing their ability to concentrate on the main assault.17 Lectures on the
Science of Special Operations also discusses raids against enemy political and civilian targets. 18 The
authors attribute the rapid U.S. success during the 1983 Grenada campaign to special operations that
secured the governor general’s residence, government offices, television broadcast facilities, and key
roads and other infrastructure in the capital of St. George’s.19 The volume describes raids to rescue
captured air and naval personnel in a section on blockade operations, but this mission would also
apply to an island landing.20
Third are psychological warfare operations.21 Science of Campaigns assigns SOF a role of
“disintegrating enemy resolve” through disinformation; it also describes a category of “special
technical warfare” that includes infiltrating enemy networks or using enemy radio and television
stations to disseminate one’s own propaganda.22 Lectures on the Science of Special Operations
similarly asserts that special operations forces will help to shape the information battlefield during an
island landing in at least two ways: seizure or destruction of enemy communications and broadcast
networks, and psychological campaigns such as distributing propaganda materials in enemy-occupied
areas, setting up wireless transmitters and receivers, and facilitating the broadcast of propaganda to
weaken enemy resolve.23
Notably, Chinese sources tend not to discuss the role of SOF in phases of an island landing beyond
the initial assault. Science of Campaigns and other texts contain little analysis of the role that the
military, including SOF units, would play in defeating a protracted counterinsurgency, perhaps
indicating a conviction that enemy resistance would collapse following a successful decapitation
strike.24 Nevertheless, given expertise in counterterrorism or other operations in restive locations
such as Xinjiang, it is possible that either PLA or PAP SOF could be utilized against resistance
fighters following a Taiwan invasion campaign.
According to Chinese writings, one of the key requirements of success is a high degree of integration
between SOF and other forces during the run up to and execution of an island landing. Lectures on
Joint Battles describes special combat forces as one of six landing groups under a common joint
16

Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 316.
Ibid., 326.
18
Guo, Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, 183.
19
Ibid. Special operations did play a notable role in Operation Urgent Fury but in this respect their mission was quite
different from what the PLA would be expected to accomplish in Taiwan. For instance, Navy SEALs rescued the
governor-general whereas the PLA would be expected to capture or eliminate key Taiwanese political figures. See Ronald
H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury—Grenada, Joint History Office, 1997,
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Urgent_Fury.pdf, 29.
20
Guo, Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, 188. A blockade would likely precede an island landing. SOF could
also attempt to rescue Chinese personnel on land.
21
For more on information operations in a Taiwan campaign, see Fiona Cunningham, Testimony before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 18, 2021,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/Fiona_Cunningham_Testimony.pdf.
22
Zhang, Science of Campaigns, 199.
23
Guo, Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, 183-4.
24
However, PLA units have conducted urban warfare training. For a discussion, see Sale Lilly, “Killing Rats in a
Porcelain Shop: PLA Urban Warfare Operations in a Taiwan Campaign,” in Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., Crossing the Strait:
China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan (Washington, DC: NDU Press, forthcoming in 2022).
17
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headquarters; the others include landing (ground), maritime, air, missile, and information groups.25
Lectures on the Science of Special Operations describes the need to achieve close coordination
between these types of forces: “special operations must work closely with other operations and
pursue them in a unified manner. This puts high demands on the coordination of planning
organizations and battlefield control.”26 For instance, SOF would need to coordinate with air and
missile forces in targeting, and with Strategic Support Force (SSF) psychological warfare and
technical reconnaissance units in information operations. However, the previous command structure,
in which the PLAAF, PLAN, and other forces were poorly integrated into the theaters, was not suited
to a doctrine that called for close coordination.
Reforms undertaken during the Xi era alleviated this challenge by granting theater commanders
authority over a wider range of forces, including PLAN SOF, and encouraging them to concentrate
on joint training.27 A 2018 China Military Science article by two staff officers from the Southern
Theater Command confirms that theater commanders are responsible for planning and operational
coordination for SOF, while the CMC’s responsibility is limited to providing overall guidance.28
Nevertheless, the lack of recent campaign texts renders it difficult to evaluate how the system will
operate at the tactical and operational levels. It is also worth noting that, in practice, the reforms did
not create standing joint task forces that would encourage stronger peacetime coordination across the
different services.29 Moreover, as discussed below, the shift to a theater structure has not necessarily
resulted in closer integration of SOF into joint training and some SOF, including those under the PAP
and Airborne Corps, remain outside theater purview.

25

Chen, Lectures on Joint Battles, 169. This mirrors the incorporation of SOF into joint constructs as depicted in other
PLA writings. See Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2018), 35.
26
Guo, Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, 183.
27
For a general description of the new command structure, see Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint
Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:1-2 (2017), 169-195.
唐旻晖，徐常 [Tang Minhui and Xu Chang], 站在新的历史起点, 加快推动我军特种部队建设转型 [“Reach a New
Historical Starting Point and Accelerate the Transformation of the PLA’s Special Forces”], 中国军事科学 [China Military
Science], no. 2 (2018), 54.
29
The need for closer integration of force at the tactical and operational levels is a theme of recent PLA writings on joint
operations. See Xiao, Science of Military Strategy, 264-7. See also Derek Solen, “Chinese Views of All-Domain
Operations,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, August 31, 2020,
www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2310442/chinese-views-of-all-domain-operations/.
28

5

Exhibit 2. A member of the PLAAF “Thunder Gods” SOF brigade participates in a water-landing parachute drill.30

Force Structure and Capabilities
Most PLA SOF are organized into brigades assigned to each of the five Theater Commands.31
According to authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese sources, each of the PLAA’s 13 Group
Armies has a SOF brigade, and the PLAAF Airborne Corps, PLAN Marine Corps, and the PLA
Rocket Force (PLARF) each has one SOF brigade apiece.32 Some of these SOF brigades are
relatively new formations converted from conventional forces as part of an attempted expansion of
SOF capabilities, and they are probably more similar in mission and force structure to the U.S. Army
Rangers than the elite Delta Force.33 These formations and their approximate geographic locations
are depicted in Exhibit 3 (see Appendix for further details). Judging by location, the units most likely
to support an amphibious assault on Taiwan are the five SOF brigades of the Eastern and Southern
Theater Commands, along with the PLAN Marine Corps’ Sea Dragons brigade (蛟龙突击队), based
in Hainan, and possibly the PLAAF’s Thunder Gods brigade (雷神突击队), located near the eastern
顾熙熙，沈帅 [Gu Xixi and Shen Shuai], 想成为特种兵吗? 请收下这份指南 [“Want to Become a Special Forces
Soldier? Please Accept This Guide”], 我们的天空微信公众号 [Our Sky WeChat Account], October 10, 2020,
http://www.81.cn/tz/2020-10/10/content_9915940.htm.
31
For a pre-reform assessment of Chinese SOF, see Dennis J. Blasko, “Chinese Special Operations Forces: Not Like
‘Back at Bragg,’” War on the Rocks, January 1, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/chinese-special-operationsforces-not-like-back-at-bragg/.
30

For a partial listing of PLA SOF from an unofficial source, see 21 支特战劲旅 磨砺反恐尖刀 [“21 Special Forces
Contingents, Practiced Anti-Terrorism Daggers”], 大公报 [Takung Pao], September 2, 2019,
www.takungpao.com/news/232108/2019/0902/343977.html; The Military Balance (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2021), 249-255.
33
For instance, one official source indicates that a motorized infantry brigade in the 81 st Group Army (Central Theater
Command) was converted to a SOF brigade in May 2017. See 创新人才培养, 加快新质战斗力生成 [“Innovate
Personnel Training, Accelerate the Production of New Quality Combat Power”], 军事报道 [Military Affairs Report], May
10, 2020, https://tv.cctv.com/v/v1/VIDEbuNXXK8M9UEC2gqI34Tk200510.html.
32

6

seaboard in Hubei province. In addition, reconnaissance battalions assigned to the PLAA Group
Armies and PLAN Marine Corps brigades are not explicitly designated as SOF but may also carry
out special warfare missions in a Taiwan scenario.34

Exhibit 3. PLA Special Forces Units and Locations35

Most relevant to a large-scale island landing are the PLAA’s SOF brigades. While their mission is
distinct, their internal structure bears resemblance to other PLAA brigades in some respects. For
instance, SOF brigades follow a standard “brigade-battalion-company-team” (旅-营-连-队组)
hierarchy and their field command arrangements includes basic, reserve, and rear command posts. 36
吴登峰，范旭东，翟思宇 [Wu Dengfeng, Fan Xudong, and Di Siyu], 海军陆战队某旅侦察营：锻造特种作战的利
刃尖刀 [“Marine Corps Unidentified Brigade Reconnaissance Battalion: Forging The Blades and Daggers of Special
Warfare”], 新华 [Xinhua News Agency], December 27, 2018, www.81.cn/jwgz/2018-12/27/content_9389652.htm.
34

35

Peter Wood, Twitter post, January 5, 2020, 6:36 p.m.,
https://twitter.com/peterwood_pdw/status/1213967625849434112?lang=en. Used with permission of Peter Wood.
董伟，王本胜 [Dong Wei and Wang Bensheng], 特种作战旅如何构建敏捷化指挥体系 [“How to Build an Agile
Command System for a Special Operations Brigade”], 中国社会科学报 [Chinese Social Sciences Today], no. 1820
(2019), http://sscp.cssn.cn/xkpd/jsx_20175/201911/t20191121_5046131.html.
36
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This structure more closely resembles the U.S. Army Rangers rather than Delta Force or SEALs,
which delegate more authority to the team commander. Like army combined arms brigades, SOF
brigades aspire to operate independently on the battlefield. This requires organic support capabilities
such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance battalions (无人机侦察营)37 and fire support
companies (火力支援连) with truck-mounted cannons, heavy mortars, and shoulder-fired surface-toair missiles.38 However, a 2018 China Military Science article suggests that more staff officers
responsible for operations, intelligence, and coordination with other branches are needed for those
battalions to be able to operate independently.39
SOF brigades reportedly emphasize a “centralized command style” (集中式指挥) more common in
conventional units rather than a flexible “task-oriented command style” (任务式指挥).40 Centralized
command is facilitated primarily by radio and satellite communications, which conventional units
might also employ.41 However, SOF brigades apparently suffer from some of the same command and
control problems that conventional PLA units of the same size might encounter. For instance, two
scholars at the PLAA Command Academy noted in 2019 that down-echelon voice communications
were difficult to maintain using comparatively slow, single-function, and limited bandwidth radios
and satellite communications terminals. This meant that brigade, battalion, and company
commanders did not have datalinks with each other, and SOF battalions, companies, and platoons did
not have consistent access to the Integrated Command Platform or its command automation
capabilities.42
There is some evidence that SOF brigades have instituted arrangements to facilitate tactical and
operational coordination with other services and branches. According to two PLA scholars, PLAA
SOF brigades reportedly integrate personnel from other services by including liaison officers from
relevant PLAN, PLAAF, PLAA aviation, and artillery units in the basic command post. A SOF
brigade basic command post is “authorized to give priority to the support of intelligence, firepower,
and other forces,” and fire support from naval, air force, or long-range artillery units can be guided
through liaisons according to target detection and position information.43 This structure is consistent
with the emphasis of Chinese theorists on close coordination between SOF and supported units in
reconnaissance, strike, and psychological warfare missions during an island landing campaign.
PLA SOF likely have priority access to modern equipment, such as individual soldier
communications systems and night vision equipment. They are also likely to have access to special
mission equipment that would be vital in an amphibious assault on Taiwan.44 For instance, SOF have
fielded UAVs of varying sizes, from hand-launched UAVs and micro-copters at the squad level to
微光作业 静谧夜空中敌情复杂险象环生 [“Shimmering Operations in the Quiet Night Sky in a Complex and
Dangerous Enemy Situation”], 国防军事早报 [National Defense and Military Affairs Morning Report], July 27, 2020,
http://www.js7tv.cn/video/202007_224641.html.
37

演兵 2020 陆军特种兵: 磨砺锻造新时代特战利箭 [“Army Special Warfare Exercises in 2020: Sharpen and Forge
Special Warfare Weapons in the New Era”], 央视网 [CCTV], December 29, 2020,
https://tv.cctv.com/2020/12/29/VIDEvyusavi5RsjtaqQHpu4L201229.shtml.
39
Tang and Xu, “Reach a Historical Starting Point and Accelerate the Transformation of the PLA’s Special Forces,” 54.
40
Dong and Wang, “How to Build an Agile Command System for a Special Operations Brigade.”
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Much of this equipment is not necessarily exclusive to designated SOF, but is apparently distributed among both SOF
units and smaller non-SOF reconnaissance formations.
38
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medium-altitude BZK-005 vehicles as part of larger formations. In some instances, SOF units use
commercially available off-the-shelf micro-UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ahead of assault drills.45 As noted above, there are also dedicated UAV battalions in some Army SOF
brigades; these field larger UAVs.46 PLA SOF also claim to use various ground-based battlefield
sensors and instruments. Recent Chinese media reports show members of one Eastern Theater
Command Army SOF brigade using laser designators and troops from a reconnaissance company in
a different theater setting up reconnaissance instruments and ground-based sensors.47 PLA writings
stress that SOF should gather technical signature intelligence using battlefield sensors, but little
information on this hardware was available at the time of writing.48
The most advanced equipment available to PLA SOF is likely used in clandestine maritime
operations. This equipment includes undersea sensors, diver propulsion vehicles, and undersea
personnel delivery systems, though the deployment and operational status of this equipment is
unclear from open sources. For instance, undated screengrabs of official CCTV Military Report
episodes showed PLA frogmen training with diver propulsion systems and a larger diver delivery
submersible, and an unofficial source from 2015 posted pictures of PLAN frogmen using small diver
propulsion vehicles and training to exit a submarine using torpedo tubes.49 Chinese defense industry
researchers have developed diver navigation aids, radios, and handheld direction-finding sonars for
special operations in low-visibility underwater environments, though it is unclear which models have
reached the force and in what numbers.50 Such equipment would be critical in both reconnaissance
and sabotage operations in the initial phases of an island landing.
Beyond the PLA, China’s paramilitary force also has SOF capabilities that could be relevant during a
Taiwan contingency. While the PAP maintains SWAT-like forces in each province that perform law
enforcement functions on a local scale, it also has a few elite commando units that can be employed
in more demanding circumstances farther from their home bases. Under a recent restructuring, these
units were assigned to two national-level “mobile contingents” (机动总队) that do not have a fixed

The example used here is a DJI Mavic Air model. See 直击演训场: 利刃出鞘 解放军特战旅年终大考战味十足! 换羽
新飞 陆军合成营数字化装备全副武装跑出强军加速度! [“Go Straight to the Training Ground: The Sharp Edge of the
Sword Is Out of the Sheath, PLA Special Operations Brigade End of the Year Assessment Has a Full War Flavor! Change
of Feathers, New Flight, PLAA Combined Arms Brigade Digitized Equipment Accelerates the Strong Army”], 国防军事
早报 [National Defense and Military Affairs Morning Report], November 25, 2020,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VLHZgDpf30.
46
“Shimmering Operations in the Quiet Night Sky in a Complex and Dangerous Enemy Situation.” Of note, UAV
availability is not unique to SOF units. Other reconnaissance units of Group Army brigades also use a variety of UAVs for
airborne ISR.
45

Of note, this equipment is not exclusive to SOF. See “Go Straight to the Training Ground;” 九九重阳送温暖 [“Sending
Warmth on the Double Ninth Festival”], 军事报道 [CCTV Military Affairs Report], October 17, 2018,
http://www.js7tv.cn/video/201810_161502.html.
48
Dong and Wang, “How to Build an Agile Command System for a Special Operations Brigade.”
47

为何中国官方突然高调展示蛙人艇? 专家称意在震慑越南勿轻举妄动 [“Why Did Chinese Officials Suddenly
Display a Frogman Boat? Expert Says It Is to Convince Vietnam Not to Act Rashly”], Sina News, January 28, 2020,
https://k.sina.com.cn/article_7094401811_1a6dbfb1300100pc4s.html?from=mil; H.I. Sutton, “Chinese Naval Special
Forces Projects and Capabilities,” Covert Shores, May 28, 2015,
http://www.hisutton.com/Chinese%20Naval%20Special%20Forces%20projects%20and%20capabilities.html.
49

For one example, see 白峻，曾锋，刘峰，郭晓敏，余俊 [Bai Jun, Zeng Feng, Liu Feng, Guo Xiaomin, and Yu Jun],
蛙人水下信息系统发展综述 [“A Summary of Frogman Information System Development”], 电声技术 [Electroacoustic
Technology] 38 no. 9 (2014), 259-264.
50
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geographic boundary.51 Both are large rapid reaction forces with mixed capabilities that can be
deployed in major contingencies. Most relevant to a Taiwan scenario is the Second Mobile
Contingent, whose headquarters is in Fuzhou (but subordinate units are scattered across southern
China). This organization has two SOF detachments, one of which is believed to be the Snow
Leopards commando unit (雪豹突击队). Founded in 2002, the Snow Leopards were based in Beijing
but moved to Guangzhou as part of the restructuring.52 The unit focuses on counterterrorism and
hostage rescue, and includes assault, reconnaissance, explosive ordnance disposal, and sniper
teams.53 Its members possess standard equipment for “close-range fire strikes,” including pistols and
assault rifles, while some also operate crossbows, submachine guns, and heavy machine guns. 54 Its
location, internal composition, and equipment would make it applicable to some aspects of a Taiwan
contingency, including protecting critical infrastructure within China from sabotage and even
conducting “political rendition”-type operations in Taiwan.55

Exhibit 4. Members of the PAP “Snow Leopards” pose for a photo following a training exercise. 56
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Training
SOF units practice a variety of skills relevant to an island landing, though Chinese sources describe
difficulties that could diminish those forces’ readiness for a Taiwan campaign. Army SOF, for
instance, practice obstacle clearing, stealthy marches, survival behind enemy lines, direction-finding,
nighttime reconnaissance, observational reporting, blocking maneuvers, and battlefield first aid. 57
The PLAN Marine Corps “Sea Dragons” commandos reportedly spend more than a year learning
parachuting, rappelling, direction-finding, special vehicle-driving, search and seizure, demolition,
and hand-to-hand combat skills, as well as reconnaissance skills like map identification, photo-taking
and video recording, and encryption protocols for transmitting intelligence.58 The PLAAF Airborne
Corps “Thunder Gods” SOF brigade trains for high-altitude, high-opening and high-altitude, lowopening parachute jumps,59 among other skills. SOF personnel also train to capture high value targets
for intelligence purposes (捕俘) for a variety of campaigns, including an island-landing scenario.60
Official Chinese media routinely refer to SOF units as “tri-phibious” (三栖) or “quad-phibious” (四
栖), referring to their ability to operate from air, land, sea, and underwater.61 Army SOF units from
the Eastern Theater Command practice combat swimming, paddling in small rubber boats, shooting
from moving watercraft, and scuba diving.62 In a 2016 exercise, troops from a Southern Theater
Command Army SOF brigade fast-roped from helicopters at 20 meters above water, then traveled
5km to a beach using surface and subsurface methods.63 The Sea Dragons practice deploying rubber
boats and fast-roping frogmen from helicopters into the water.64 Likewise, the Thunder Gods held
large training events in 2019 and 2020 where personnel parachuted into water, practicing extrication
from parachute harnesses and the use of steerable parachutes.65
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Exhibit 5. Sniper affiliated with the PLAN “Sea Dragons” conducts a shooting drill.66

SOF units have also demonstrated rapid extraction capabilities across multiple domains. In 2017
footage, PLAN Marine Corps frogmen practiced a diver extraction method where they boarded a
passing motorized rigid inflatable boat from the water, while a 2020 image showed the Thunder
Gods apparently practicing a rapid extraction using a helicopter rope suspension technique.67 Other
extraction training undertaken during combat search and rescue drills focuses on coordination
between fire support elements to cover forces exfiltrating by truck.68
Like their PLA comrades, elite PAP SOF units also aim to improve readiness through rigorous
selection and training. The Snow Leopards, for instance, profess stringent selection standards, with
40-50 percent of recruits failing to pass initial screening.69 Nevertheless, a senior officer described
retention as a problem, with fewer long-serving members than comparable units in other countries.70
The Snow Leopards’ annual “Devil Week” training simulates operations in “actual combat
environments” including deserts, jungles, sea, air, and urban locations. Most of this training focuses
on counterterrorism assignments, including water-to-shore training featured in the 2020 Devil
http://www.js7tv.cn/video/202008_226019.html; 空降兵某旅成建制完成水上跳伞 [“A Parachute Brigade Completes
Above-Water Parachuting”], 国防军事早报 [National Defense and Military Affairs Morning Report], August 10, 2020,
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Online], August 4, 2017, http://www.js7tv.cn/video/201708_106487.html; 顾熙熙，沈帅 [ Gu Xixi and Shen Shuai], 想
成为特种兵吗? 请收下这份指南 [“Do You Want to Become a Special Operator? Please Accept This Guide”], 中国军网
[China Military Online], October 10, 2020, http://www.81.cn/tz/2020-10/10/content_9915940.htm.
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Week.71 The Snow Leopards and other PAP units have also regularly participated in international
exercises and competitions, mostly focused on counterterrorism.72
PLA training instructors stress that special operations are mostly squad-sized maneuvers, involving
only 1-2 personnel at a time or 6-12 personnel at most73 (similar to the size and scale of U.S. Green
Beret detachments or some Navy SEAL teams). Having personnel with multiple skills is considered
critical to survival and success in small-unit operations.74 Small-unit maneuvers provide SOF with
low-risk opportunities to practice skills relevant to an amphibious assault. In August 2020, for
instance, members of a 72nd Group Army SOF brigade landed on a small, uninhabited, and
unfamiliar island in the East China Sea, disembarked from small motorboats, and swam to the island
to achieve surprise. Once ashore, they scaled cliffs and stormed a simulated rear command post (后
备指挥所), quickly collected and processed intelligence through document exploitation, and used
special communication protocols to report the information up echelon.75
Beyond individual and small-unit drills, PLA SOF units also train in larger, more complex
combined-arms formations that showcase likely SOF missions during an amphibious landing on
Taiwan. In December 2020, PLAN Marine Corps SOF participated in a combined arms island
landing and seizure exercise involving squad-sized (班组) mechanized infantry units. In the opening
phase, SOF used mine-clearing line charges to destroy landing obstacles, while sniper teams
simultaneously seized optimal sniping positions and began to ambush critical points on the enemy’s
frontline. Shortly thereafter, SOF troops fast-roped from helicopters onto high ground and began
infiltration and attacks ahead of the main landing force. Assault vehicles then deployed smokescreens
to cover infantry fighting vehicles carrying out suppressing fire, while SOF proceeded to destroy
vital enemy targets one by one.76 SOF have also trained at the national training range at Zhurihe,
where satellite imagery has identified a mockup of Taiwan’s presidential building. However, it is
unclear how much they focus on preparing for a decapitation strike.77
Some field exercises involving larger SOF units combine tactical and operational experimentation
with validation of combat capabilities in a landing scenario. One complex three-day exercise in
September 2020 paired Z-10 attack and Mil Mi-17 transport helicopters of a 73rd Group Army
aviation brigade with troops from a 73rd Group Army SOF brigade. The helicopters proceeded to the
landing zones after evading air defense radars and anti-aircraft fire, and the aviation brigade practiced
雪豹突击队组合训练挑战极限 刷新综合战斗能力 [“Snow Leopard Commando Combination Training Challenges
Limits, Refreshes Comprehensive Combat Capabilities”], 中国新闻网 [China News Service], June 24, 2020,
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low-altitude reconnaissance before landing SOF troops.78 For their part, the SOF brigade
experimented with up to eight fast-ropes from a single Mi-17, purportedly reducing disembarkation
time by up to 50 percent.79 Other larger SOF exercises closely resemble conventional combat
operations involving organized command decision-making and coordination of fire support from
artillery and aircraft. During a September 2020 exercise, personnel from a Southern Theater
Command SOF brigade arrived in an unfamiliar area, set up a command post and corresponding
communications, and rehearsed operational planning. Other troops proceeded to carry out different
training activities in all-weather conditions against simulated opposing “Blue Team” forces,
including hostage extraction, nighttime reconnaissance, and target designation for fire support.80
Coordination between SOF and non-SOF forces mostly involves technologies and platforms that are
not organic to PLA SOF units. The most frequently depicted examples show the use of Army and
Navy rotary-wing aircraft for parachute jump training and troop transport.81 In a few publicly
reported instances, Army SOF personnel train with attack helicopters from Army aviation brigades,
in which these platforms scout landing zones.82 There is also likely direct integration of SOF
reconnaissance elements with higher-echelon intelligence authorities in recent exercises. For
instance, one winter 2020 exercise featured troops from a SOF brigade of the 82nd Group Army using
Beidou positioning, navigation, and timing transmitters issued by the former General Staff
Department Survey and Navigation Bureau to relay targeting information to a command post.83
Despite apparent progress in training, SOF face several deficiencies in preparing for island landing
operations. First, reports suggest that SOF have struggled with special mission equipment that would
be vital for successful pre-landing operations. A 2015 article by PLAN Submarine Academy special
warfare researchers published in an Army Special Forces Academy journal remarked that the limited
oxygen supply, heavy weight, excessive cavitation, and complex battery charging and assembly of
the main Chinese-built diver delivery vehicle meant that training programs for those vehicles should
be carried out only in waters pre-cleared of obstacles and debris, with no explosives within three
nautical miles of the training area for safety reasons.84 It is unclear if more recent exercises have
removed those restrictions.
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Second is inadequate attention to technical reconnaissance. Two PLAA Command College scholars
argue that SOF personnel are poorly trained to obtain and handle the intelligence collected by
technical equipment, noting that SOF brigades “focused on armed reconnaissance training at the
expense of technical reconnaissance,” resulting in “comparatively infrequent use of unmanned
vehicles and battlefield television reconnaissance” and “low reconnaissance efficiency.” 85 A heavy
emphasis on armed reconnaissance training also reportedly resulted in reduced attention to
specialized skills like aerial imagery interpretation and target recognition and indication. As a result,
“SOF officers and personnel have comparatively weak ability to obtain and handle intelligence.” 86
Third, PLA SOF do not appear to train for missions that could support offensive information warfare,
including psychological operations or unconventional warfare. There is no public mention of any
training with special mission aircraft or broadcast equipment, non-military assets, or interaction with
local populations that could support offensive psychological operations. As a result, the role of PLA
SOF in information operations would likely be limited to kinetic operations against critical
information infrastructure like network management or data centers, computer server farms, or even
undersea communications cables.87 This may also involve simple operations to plug in devices on
broadcasting antennas that would allow information operations personnel to access and exploit them.
Fourth is limited cross-service integration. There is little open-source evidence of SOF units from
different services training together or with non-SOF units from different services, except for the
occasional provision of PLAAF aircraft for Army SOF parachute jump training. 88 There is also no
evidence that the Snow Leopards or other PAP SOF units have participated in joint exercises with
PLA forces. Theater commanders have no de facto authority over PAP units (which report through
their own headquarters); this reduces the theaters’ ability to incorporate PAP units into joint training
and supervise them in a contingency.89 Absent stronger coordination, it is unlikely that PAP SOF
would be part of the initial landing, though these units could be called on once major operations are
complete to assist in hunting down political figures.90

Conclusion
PLA SOF would likely play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Their
capabilities and training are geared towards several missions that would be undertaken during the
preparatory and main assault phases of the landing, including infiltration via special mission craft and
helicopter, reconnaissance and targeting, obstacle clearance, strikes and raids, and extraction
missions. While not discussed in Chinese doctrinal sources, it is also likely that PAP or other special
forces would remain on Taiwan following a successful landing to conduct counterinsurgency-type
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missions. One area where doctrine may still be ahead of practice is information operations. It is
unclear from open-source reports that SOF are preparing for on-island propaganda work, or are
training with other relevant PLA units, including the SSF, for this mission.
While PLA SOF have made progress in recent years, several variables will influence their
performance in an island landing. One is whether SOF can field and integrate better special mission
equipment for complex and dangerous missions. While China’s defense industry undoubtedly
continues to improve manned special mission equipment for SOF, researchers have also stressed the
utility of unmanned undersea and aerial vehicles for dangerous special operations like mine and
obstacle clearing.91 Coordination and effective application of unmanned systems will call for more
demanding training and recruitment requirements within PLA SOF.
Another variable is whether SOF can effectively coordinate their operations with non-SOF
supporting and supported forces. How much coordination is necessary would likely vary by unit
composition and mission type. SOF units with a diverse range of organic capabilities, specialized
hardware, and dedicated support units may require less joint coordination than units tasked to
accomplish special operations in which the mission rather than the unit is defined as “special.” Elite
commando units like the U.S. Navy’s SEAL Team Six with dedicated transport and intelligence
support units may require little interaction with main landing forces, but others, such as brigade-sized
army units that would deploy alongside and directly support the main landing forces, may need to
coordinate more extensively. In the latter case, which appears to describe the majority of the PLA’s
SOF units, the lack of permanent joint structures below the theater level could diminish the
effectiveness of joint operations involving special forces, potentially leading to catastrophic results
similar to the failed U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iran during Operation Eagle Claw.92 Moreover,
some relevant units, including from the SSF, PAP, and Airborne Corps, are outside the theater
structure, leading to questions about joint command even at that level. Evidence that these potential
shortcomings are being addressed would be inclusion of Airborne Corps and PAP SOF in theater
command-led exercises; the establishment of permanent lower-level joint commands or liaison
arrangements; and real-world operations, perhaps in counter-terrorism missions within China and
farther from home, that would require SOF to learn lessons and adapt.
Chinese special operations would also have to reconcile the imperative for small, clandestine
operations behind enemy lines with a desire for unified command under the joint command construct.
Generally, there is a tension between the Leninist emphasis on centralization and the need to grant
autonomy to lower PLA commanders. This could be especially problematic in special operations:
centralized command could lead to poor performance if small units fail to act due to the lack of
explicit authorization, or if they are forced to maintain radio communications and thus reveal their
positions to the enemy. Evidence from training or updated doctrine could offer signs of whether SOF
teams are given adequate autonomy in the field.
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Nevertheless, even partially effective special operations could diminish Taiwan’s defenses and thus
should be explicitly addressed in defensive concepts. Taiwan’s articulation of a more “asymmetric
and innovative” way of defeating an island landing, which has been discussed in recent years under
the “overall defense concept” label, should explicitly acknowledge the threat posed by Chinese
special operations forces preceding and during all phases of an island landing and determine whether
additional changes to tactics and capabilities are needed.93 Those approaches should also identify
PLA weaknesses, such as lack of technical proficiency, limited jointness, and potential overreliance
on radio communications for command and control, and tailor responses accordingly. It is also worth
exploring whether, and how, U.S. SOF may work with their Taiwan counterparts to evaluate the
dangers posed by PLA SOF, share best practices, and conduct joint training.94
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